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Using	apps	for	contact	tracing	in	response	to	COVID-
19:	the	controversies
With	the	government	repeatedly	claiming	that	it	is	being	guided	by	science,	questions	about	the	range	of	academic
disciplines	represented	on	the	government’s	Scientific	Advisory	Group	for	Emergencies	(SAGE)	have	begun	to
emerge	alongside	reports	that	the	government	is	seeking	to	broaden	the	range	of	academic	fields	represented.
A	shadow	version	of	SAGE	has	also	been	created	with	different	experts	and	a	different	approach	to	the
transparency	of	its	work.
Writing	in	the	context	of	political	ecology,	Bruno	Latour	reminds	us	that	“every	[ecological]	crisis	opens	up	a
controversy	among	experts,	and	these	controversies	generally	preclude	the	establishment	of	a	common	front	of
indubitable	matters	of	fact	that	politicians	could	subsequently	use	in	support	of	their	decisions”	–	highlighting	the
risks	of	‘short	circuiting’	the	debates	about	science	and	society.
For	the	UK’s	COVID-19	response	early	controversies	have	included	the	utility	of	using	‘herd	immunity’	to	fight	the
virus,	and	‘nudge	theory’	to	encourage	behaviours	that	reduce	the	risk	of	infection.
These	issues	are	not	institutionalised	scientific	facts.	Rather,	using	Latour’s	terms,	they	are	potential	new	entities
which	leave	those	who	are	discussing	them	perplexed.	They	are	subject	to	scientific	trials	whose	outcomes	are
uncertain.	For	COVID-19	the	perplexities	include	whether	there	are	links	with	air	pollution,	altitude,	genetic
factors	or	smoking.	Politically	desirable	“matters	of	fact”	do	not	yet	exist.
Similarly,	claims	about	the	proportion	of	the	UK	population	likely	to	have	been	infected	have	been	challenged	as
being	based	on	“murky	data”	or	having	no	empirical	justification.
For	Latour,	these	perplexities	mean	that	politics	can	no	longer	short	circuit	“any	and	all	questioning	as	to	the	nature
of	the	complex	bonds	between	the	science	and	societies,	through	the	invocation	of	science	as	the	only	salvation
from	the	prison	of	the	social	world”.	Instead,	it	must	enter	a	due	process	of	consultation	around	the	values	society
wishes	to	apply	given	the	perplexities.	Despite	originating	in	the	study	of	ecological	science,	I	have	found	this
perspective	for	considering	the	due	process	around	scientific	perplexities	and	social	values	helpful	for	also
considering	technological	questions	especially	in	relation	to	privacy	issues.
Given	that	viruses	can	move	from	host	to	host	if	they	are	in	close	proximity	for	a	period	of	time,	contact	tracing	is
used	to	identify	people	who	may	have	been	exposed	to	individuals	who	are	found	to	have	been	infected.
Historically	this	would	only	be	done	manually	(“Where	did	you	go	today?”	or	“Who	did	you	speak	to?”)	with	at	risk
individuals	then	being	contacted	and	advised	to	take	remedial	measures	such	as	self-isolating.
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Technological	solutions	have	been	proposed	to	complement	manual	contact	tracing,	particularly	around	the	issue	of
identifying	individuals	who	have	been	in	close	proximity	with	infected	individuals.	Some	solutions	are	relatively	low-
tech	and	can	be	based	on	a	feature	phone	(for	example,	by	triangulating	the	phone’s	location	from	the	cell	towers	it
has	connected	to)	or	recording	who	‘checks-in’	to	particular	locations	such	as	businesses,	parks	and	train	stations.
The	UK	and	elsewhere	have	plans	to	involve	the	use	of	smartphones	and,	in	particular,	Bluetooth	Low	Energy
(BLE)	tracking	to	spot	phones	(and	their	owners)	that	are	nearby,	not	least	because	proximity	tracing	is	about	who
has	been	close	to	an	infected	individual	rather	than,	necessarily,	where	the	contact	took	place.
In	this	context,	a	number	of	technological	choices	exist	with	each	choice	introducing	its	own	perplexities	around	the
likelihood	that	individuals	will	adopt	and	use	the	technology	in	their	daily	lives	and	the	potential	societal
implications,	including	data	protection,	privacy	and	discrimination,	that	can	arise.
For	example,	the	partnership	between	Google	and	Apple	to	build	BLE	tracking	capabilities	into	their	phone
operating	systems	explicitly	acknowledges	the	growing	concerns	around	the	privacy	of	personal	health	data	and
they	have	explicitly	designed	their	system	to	operate	in	a	decentralised	manner	as	well	as	periodically	changing	the
device-ID	that	is	shared	with	nearby	phones.
In	contrast,	some	countries	want	central	databases	for	their	apps.	For	example,	the	UK	proposals	appear	to	involve
a	persistent	identifier	which	is	shared	with	the	National	Health	Service	when	the	app	is	first	set	up.	The	app	will	then
start	logging	the	distance	between	the	phone	and	other	phones	nearby	that	also	have	the	app	installed	and	in
operation.	The	resulting	log	of	how	close	an	individual	is	to	others	will	be	stored	securely	on	the	phone.	If	the	phone
owner	becomes	ill	with	symptoms	of	COVID-19	then	they	can	allow	the	app	to	inform	the	NHS.	The	central	server
will	then	trigger	an	alert	to	those	other	app	users	who	have	come	into	significant	contact	with	the	unwell	person.
The	NHS	believes	that	there	are	important	public	health	benefits	to	its	centralised	approach,	including	the	ability	to
easily	tailor	the	alerts	in	light	of	evolving	scientific	understanding	(e.g.	about	proximity	distances	and	durations)
even	if	other	factors	(such	as	weather,	and	walls	between	phones)	cannot	be	assessed	and	risk	generating	false
positives	and	associated	self-isolation	recommendations.
The	absence	of	“matters	of	fact”	about	which	approach	will	be	the	most	effective	in	using	technology	to	help
address	the	spread	of	the	coronavirus	has	also	resulted	in	differences	within	the	European	consortium	developing
Pan-European	Privacy-Preserving	Proximity	Tracing	(PEPP-PT)	community.	As	a	consequence	the	work	“now
considers	two	privacy-preserving	approaches:	‘centralised’	and	‘decentralised’”.
The	choice	of	architecture	may	well	also	influence	the	take	up	of	the	chosen	app,	with	experience	from	countries
like	Australia	suggesting	that	take	up	is	often	low	(currently	less	than	20%	of	the	population)	when	scientific	models
are	suggesting	that	take	up	levels	of	80%	of	smartphone	users	(or	60%	of	the	population)	are	needed	for	the	UK.
Even	the	most	popular	apps,	such	as	WhatsApp,	have	not	reached	these	80%	smartphone	penetration	levels.
If	app-based	contact	tracing	is	to	be	an	effective	element	of	our	response	to	the	coronavirus,	it	cannot	evoke
“science”	to	justify	the	design	choices	made	by	the	app	developers.	Instead,	there	must	be	a	fuller	articulation	of	the
choices	made	and	the	evidence	used	to	support	those	choices,	to	allow	society	to	have	a	fuller	consultation	about
how	it	wants	to	respond	to	the	virus.	A	useful,	but	not	necessarily	perfect,	first	step	will	be	the	full	disclosure	of	the
data	protection	and	security	impact	assessments	underpinning	the	apps	and	a	clear	statement	about	what	data	will
be	stored,	who	it	will	be	shared	with	and	what	will	happen	to	the	data	once	the	worst	of	the	pandemic	ends.
♣♣♣
Notes:
This	blog	post	appeared	first	on	LSE’s	Department	of	Management	blog.
The	post	expresses	the	views	of	its	author(s),	not	the	position	of	LSE	Business	Review	or	the	London	School
of	Economics.
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